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Limits to Regulating Irregular Migration
in Turkey: What Constrains Public
Policy and Why?
SAI˙ME OZCURUMEZ & DENI˙Z YETKI˙N
Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
ABSTRACT Turkey, similar to its counterparts in emerging markets, has been aiming to
reduce irregular migration effectively and comprehensively with various sets of policies
since the 1990s. However, the number of undocumented migrants continues to increase and
unregistered foreign employment is as high as ever. This study aims to explain the reasons
underlying this conundrum by focusing on the nature of the policies adopted and the charac-
teristics of the target population relying on data collected on a sample of unregistered foreign
workers in the textile sector in Istanbul. It argues that the reasons for the limited effectiveness
of the policies is attributable to structural factors such as inherent problems with the existing
policies for regulating irregular migration and preferences as well as the behavior of the unre-
gistered foreign workers and their employers.
Introduction
Modern states have always aimed to control movement across and within their borders
since the marking of territorial sovereignty. These efforts, however, have never gone
unchallenged. One recent test stems from irregular, undocumented and illegal mobi-
lity, which has increased in proportion to pull factors in emerging markets and push
factors in developing countries. States invariably tackle this challenge with a standard
policy toolkit consisting of stricter regulations on border control and criminalization of
unregistered employment of foreigners as well as amnesties for providing regulariz-
ation opportunities. Notwithstanding these efforts, the reality of unregistered foreign
employment and irregular migration persists. This study addresses this conun-
drum—the conspicuous mismatch between policy objectives and outcomes in the
area of irregular migration—relying on a case study on unregistered foreigners who
are employed in the textile sector in Istanbul, Turkey. This paper concludes that in com-
bating irregular migration, the universal policy toolkit falls short of achieving its objec-
tives for two reasons. First, this one-size-fits-all toolkit is composed of a generic set of
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instruments, which do not indiscriminately address particular needs of a given state.
Second, these policies are implemented without having identified the root causes of
irregular migration, i.e. inexorable structural factors as well as acute needs of migrants,
both of which render this type of mobility interminable.
The argument is presented by, first, demonstrating how the existing literature on
irregular migration is focused exclusively on immigration control and regularization
efforts in the form of sanctions and amnesties. By doing so, the literature largely over-
looks the choices and behavior of irregular migrants themselves, which are, we
observe, beyond states’ control and results in the overestimation of the effectiveness
of such measures on the ground. In order to overcome this neglect, this research
complements the findings of the policy measures literature with those of studies on
the characteristics of the target population and contends that only through a synthesis
as such can we explain the striking gap between policy objectives and outcomes.
Second, the legislation on irregular migration and unregistered employment in
Turkey is reviewed so as to show how the policy measures are paralleled to those uni-
versally adopted in other states. The paper emphasizes how such emulation results in
the gap between policy objectives and outcomes in Turkey as well. Third, the paper
presents data from interviews carried out with unregistered foreign workers and ident-
ifies the root causes of persistent irregular migration that the existing policy measures
cannot address. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of research findings that war-
rants an ex ante policy impact assessment taking into account both the specific
characteristics of the target population and the observed results of policy measures
implemented in other states.
Studying Irregular Migration: From Immigration Control and
Regularization to Migrants’ Preferences and Behavior
This section reviews the studies on international mobility and irregular migration,
which focuses on immigration control and regularization policies and amnesties.
The section will show how the existing general literature suffers from the pitfalls
of state-centralism, as it largely overlooks the choices and behavior of irregular
migrants themselves. The literature on Turkey, too, parallels the state-centered
focus in the general literature. The section concludes by calling for combining
these analyses of state policies on immigration control and regularization with
others focusing on the characteristics of the target population. Only through such syn-
thesis the study explains the mismatch between policy objectives and outcomes in the
area of irregular migration.
The early literature on international migration emphasizes states’ ability to control
cross-border mobility. This early wave, dominated by neoclassical economists,
explained international migration through macro- and micro-level dynamics. Those
who focus on macro-level variables explained international mobility by focusing on
labor migration in the process of economic development. According to this perspec-
tive, governments are able to control migration by regulating labor markets in the
receiving and sending countries.1 Others who focused on micro-level dynamics,
Limits to Regulating Irregular Migration in Turkey 443
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however, emphasized the role of immigrants’ agency. These scholars claimed that
rational individuals migrate in order to increase their earnings. According to this litera-
ture, governments could control international migration with the help of incentive
structures, i.e. specific policies that affect expected gains in the sending and/or receiv-
ing countries—for example, through policies lowering the likelihood of employment
or raising the risk of underemployment in the destination country (by introducing sanc-
tions on employers), through programs that raise income levels in the country of origin
(such as long-term development programs), or through strategies that increase the
costs (both psychological and material) of migration.2 A later wave in the literature
stemming from what is termed as the ‘new economics of migration’, too, saw states
as able to steer migrants’ immigration decisions, and hence irregular migration
itself, through policy levers creating incentives, and more significantly disincentives,
for mobility in labor markets, insurance markets, capital markets and futures markets.3
Based on the common perception that states were actually able to control
migration, another body of literature focused on regularization policies and amnes-
ties. This literature documented episodes in different states on the introduction of
amnesties for irregular migrants during the past three decades (e.g. Argentina in
1994, Belgium in 2004, the USA in 1986 and Greece in 1997–1998 and 2001).
However, a skeptical line emerged within this literature whereby various studies
pointed to limits of states’ control over irregular international mobility as evidenced
by elusive results achieved by regularization measures and amnesties. One authorita-
tive empirical study on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act introducing an
amnesty in the USA, for example, concluded that while this law resulted in lower
levels of cross-border interceptions for a period in the short run, irregular migration
increased thereafter only to return to former levels several years later.4 Despite the
negative findings of these studies, it is striking that introducing amnesties continue
to remain as a common policy measure.5 While there emerged no consensus
among policy-makers and the public on whether amnesties actually curb illegal
migration, very few studies attempted to explain why these regularization measures
and amnesties do not deliver on their promise.6 This lacuna stems from the fact that
the existing general literature suffers from the pitfalls of state-centralism in that
studies focusing on immigration control and regularization measures largely overlook
the choices and behavior of irregular migrants themselves, which may potentially
explain why individuals with irregular status continue to take the risk of staying in
the destination country.7 In this way, the literature categorically overlooks the possi-
bility that irregular migrants may actually prefer to remain irregular/unregistered.
Such choice by migrants negates the rationale for the oft-resorted regularization pol-
icies altogether. This study aims to overcome this gap by examining how irregular
migrants’ preferences and behavior sustain irregularity in an environment where
states continue to hold onto control practices, regularization measures and amnesties.
In parallel to the general literature on international mobility, there emerged studies
on Southern European states in general, and Turkey in particular, as they are situated
on Europe’s most tested borders. In the case of research on Turkey, the literature, too,
focuses on immigration control without addressing why irregular migrants actually
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prefer to remain so. This state-centered literature concentrated on the rules, regu-
lations and policies on irregular migration8 in a policy context of deepening Europea-
nization.9 Other studies, which focused on irregular migrants themselves, described
how human trafficking and smuggling takes place through Turkey,10 how migrants
survive in general11 and how they operate in the labor market12 in particular. There-
fore all of these studies cited above exclusively focused on state control from a poli-
tico-legal perspective, and when they did study migrants, they did so only to describe
the livelihoods of migrants from a sociological perspective. Paralleling the gap in the
international literature on irregular migration, therefore, works on Turkey did not aim
at empirically studying migrants’ preferences and behavior within the constraints set
by states. Such lacuna in this literature, too, precluded an analysis that would explain
the reasons behind the mismatch between policy objectives and outcomes.
The Added Value of Studying the Case of Unregistered Foreign Employment
in the Textile Sector
In order to bridge this gap not only in the scholarly literature but also on policy objec-
tives and outcomes, this study examines both state efforts and migrant views through
interviews with irregular migrants and their employers in the textile sector in Istanbul,
as well as interviews with policy-makers, employers and trade unions. The textile
sector constitutes a crucial case in understanding the reasons for unregistered
foreign employment and why regularization policies remain constrained in their out-
comes.13 Although reliable data do not exist as to the magnitude of informality in the
workforce and it is difficult to estimate the share of foreign workers in this sector,
textiles is often referred by experts in the field to as one of the most competitive
sectors in the Turkish economy which thrives on informal employment. Moreover,
official sources confirm that this sector is also one where undocumented foreign
workers are highly concentrated along with tourism.14 Istanbul, followed by Bursa
and Eskis¸ehir, is the major hub of the textile industry15 and these constitute areas
of major concentration of unregistered foreign workers. These patterns are confirmed
by the largest labor union in the textile sector, Textile Knitting and Clothing Industry
Workers’ Union (Tu¨rkiye Tekstil, O¨rme ve Giyim Sanayi I˙s¸c¸ileri Sendikası, TEKSI˙F),
which declared that over 80 percent of the workforce in the sector remain unregistered
and that this sector employs a bulk of unregistered foreign workers.16 By bringing
original research on the textile sector in Turkey and unregistered foreign employment
therein, this study advances the state-of-the-art of research on irregular migration. It
does so by shedding new empirical light on migrants’ preferences and behavior that
would complement the existing research on state control focusing on legal and
administrative changes. The next section provides an overview of these changes.
Aligning With The Lawful Alla Turca
Since the 1990s, Turkey has increasingly attracted regular and irregular international
migration from mainly Russia, the New Independent States, Central and Eastern
Limits to Regulating Irregular Migration in Turkey 445
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Europe, who arrived as petty traders, tourists and domestic workers.17 In the past two
decades, many irregular migrants from countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq trans-
ited through Turkey.18 Although there are no reliable statistics reported on how many
of the foreigners entering Turkey become undocumented workers, our interviews
suggest that a significant percentage of those who enter as tourists do become “tem-
porary residents and/or ‘de facto’ immigrants.”19 According to the interview data, a
group of the temporary residents engage in unregistered work as sales representatives
in the textile sector in Istanbul particularly if they come from countries with which
these small shops trade mainly due to their language skills.20 These individuals con-
tinue to remain in Turkey by renewing their tourist visas or prefer staying with
expired visas.21 Increasing number of demands for entry and stay in Turkey has
been regulated by a plethora of legislation dispersed across the jurisdiction of
various ministries, which arguably has also resulted in widening the gap between
the policy objective and outcome in the last few decades.
Until the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), matters con-
cerning the entry, stay and exit of foreigners in Turkey were governed by the Law on
Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey (Law No. 5683, adopted in 1950), the
Passport Law (Law No. 5682, adopted in 1950) and the Law on Work Permits for
Foreigners (LWPF, Law No. 4817, adopted in 2003). Since the 1950s, there have
been 13 addendums and 8 amendments to these existing laws; however, none of
these amendments directly addressed the issue of irregular migration. A provision
on the rights of foreigners had been added to the 1961 Constitution, however, who
had been identified as “the foreigner” had not been defined by law at the time.22
Law No. 4817, LWPF, adopted in 2003, defined “a foreigner” as the one who is
not a Turkish Citizen according to Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403.23 This law
also constituted one of the first formal attempts at introducing and implementing a
single legislation for effective prevention against unregistered foreign employment.24
In addition to initiatives on amendments to laws and regulations governing the entry
and stay of foreigners, Turkish policy-makers focused on information dissemination,
awareness raising campaigns and training of employers to encourage legal employ-
ment of foreigners through mainly the Action Plan to Fight against Informal Labor
during the 2000s.25
In 2003, Turkish Citizenship Law, Law No. 403, was amended introducing strict
measures and requirements such as the obligation to wait for three years before start-
ing the naturalization procedures of foreigners married to Turkish citizens with the
objective of preventing “fake marriages” which were considered as facilitating irre-
gular migration (especially of women), human smuggling and trafficking, and also
unregistered foreign employment.26 In 2004, Road Transportation Law came into
force stipulating penalties against human smuggling; and in 2005, Article 79 of the
new Turkish Penal Code (Law No: 5237) introduced heavy sanctions to migrant
smugglers.27
The policy outcomes of all the policy initiatives of the 2000s cited above, to fight
irregular migration, constituting of sanctions to violators of visa laws and those who
abuse the system, remain elusive. According to official statistics and EU Progress
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Reports of the 2000s, unregistered foreign employment and the number of irregular
immigrants continued to increase in the late 1990s and 2000s. From 1995 to 2010, the
number of foreigners coming to Turkey increased from 6,762,956 to 27,024,609, and
829,161 irregular migrants were apprehended in the same period.28 The share of the
informal economy also increased in the same period from around 25 percent to over
31 percent.29 In the early part of the 2000s, the informal economy was estimated to
account for 50 percent of the total economy.30
The reported statistics on the combat against irregular migration in the latter parts
of the 2000s fluctuate. The numbers of apprehended irregular migrants gradually
decreased from 65,737 in 2008 to 34,345 in 2009 and 32,667 in 2010, and increased
to 44,415 in 2011 as cited in EU Progress Reports. Although these fluctuations vali-
date the claim that sanctions or amnesties are highly unlikely to drastically change
patterns of irregular migration or the unregistered employment of foreigners in the
longer term, policy-makers cite the sanctions as relatively successful in decreasing
irregular migration and unregistered foreign employment. They characterize these
fluctuations as a sign of policy success. An amendment to Law No. 5683 (Law on
Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey) on October 10, 2011 stipulated that
foreigners will be able to renew their visa in the country if they have not overstayed
the 90-day limit, and they may be issued a six-month residence permit.31 Our inter-
views suggest that policy-makers have identified this amendment as highly effective
in reducing the levels of unregistered unemployment of foreigners, and increasing
applications for work and residence permits by foreigners. Our interview data
suggest that applications for residence permits jumped twofold from more than
35,000 to nearly 80,000 from 2011 to 2012, and work permits granted increased
from close to 30,000 to 42,000 in the same period. However, there are no clear
grounds for suggesting that this jump in the positive direction is attributable to the
amendment. It is highly likely that such change is a consequence of both the sanctions
and the easing of visa issuance.
On June 7, 2012, the Ministry of Interior issued an amnesty, according to which all
foreigners in Turkey without a visa or residence permit (regardless of the duration of
the visa violation, the residence fees and penalties resulting from violations of up to
six months) could apply for a residence permit.32 The objective of this amnesty,
similar to the previous domestic initiatives, was to reduce the number of irregular
immigrants and prevent unregistered employment by allowing foreigners (who
were in irregular status) to legalize their status in Turkey for another six months by
paying only the fees for the permits and not the fines for the violation of the
permits. This amnesty also imposed a time limit: only foreigners who violated
their residence permit before May 28, 2012 would be eligible and they would need
to pay their fees by August 15.33 The policy impact of this amnesty also remains
elusive, as there are no reported statistics, which note a significant increase on
valid work permits or a substantial decrease in irregular migration.
One of the main objectives of the LFIP, which is the most comprehensive attempt
to centralize the legislation on migration and asylum to date in Turkey, is to enhance
the institutional capacity of Turkey on immigration and international protection. The
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principles and procedures concerning the entry to, residence in and exit from Turkey,
the scope and the implementation of the protection to be provided for foreigners who
request protection, as well as the establishment, duties and authorities of the Directo-
rate General of Migration Management at the Ministry of Interior are regulated with
this new law. Article 12 of the LWPF (Law. No. 4817) has also been amended
recently, and according to this amendment foreigners shall make their first work
permit applications directly to the Turkish Consulates in their countries of origin.
Therefore, by applying for a work permit for longer periods of time, foreigners
will be able to legally reside and work in Turkey for extended periods of time
hence preventing becoming a visa-overstayer. Article 3 of the Social Insurance and
General Health Insurance, Law No. 5510, has also been amended. While the law
only covered stateless persons and refugees in the past, it currently covers foreigners
who have filed applications for international protection or the status of a stateless
person and a refugee.34 Therefore, foreigners have been introduced with another
incentive for regularizing their status in order to enjoy health and social insurance
benefits as a result of their legal employment in Turkey.
The beginning of accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005 constituted
a turning point in the changes in immigration and asylum law in Turkey. The need
for a new policy on immigration has been repeatedly highlighted as urgent by
policy-makers and scholars, and emphasized in different Progress Reports.35 The
commitment to harmonization of Turkish legislation on immigration and asylum
with that of the EU throughout the EU accession process has been clearly expressed
in the National Action Plan in 2005.36 However, whether the EU constitutes the
only and most significant impact in the policy changes in the 2000s is questionable.
Turkey was recognized as a country of immigration beginning with the late
1990s,37 and the policy initiatives, amendments to different laws and regulations
on foreigners can also be traced back to the early 2000s as discussed earlier. There-
fore, both domestic initiatives identified after the recognition of Turkey as an immi-
gration country and the EU accession process have been instrumental in the
introduction of new laws for governing migration in general and irregular migration
in particular.
While modeled on various practices in other countries for combatting irregular
migration and accelerated by the EU accession process, whether such amendments
are likely to reduce unregistered employment and irregular migration remains
elusive. This study shows the main reason for such precarious results is that
countries emulate amnesties as the most readily available and convenient tool
for regularization without necessarily focusing on an impact analysis in other
countries. Therefore, most of the amendments remain fairly limited in combatting
unregistered employment in different sectors contributing to the discrepancy
between the policy objective and outcome. The next section covers data from
interviews with a group of unregistered textile sector workers and their employers.
We aim to shed light on the reasons, which are not covered by the regulations and
laws introduced until the April 2013 law, and discuss the limits of policies on irre-
gular migration.
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From Irregular to Regular Status? Why and Why not?
This section explores the socioeconomic backgrounds, working conditions, job
seeking strategies and decision-making patterns of irregular migrants. This section
presents an analysis of their interactions with Turkish society, relations with their
employers, state institutions and networks within Turkey. The accounts of the
target population, policy-makers, employers and trade unions are highly likely to
shed light on why policies on unregistered foreign workers and irregular migration
are ineffective.
Remaining Unregistered as Choice?
Data from our interviews with policy-makers suggest that amendments in regu-
lations and amnesties aim to control the informal labor market of foreigners
while improving their working conditions in Turkey. However, the account of
undocumented migrants suggests that they remain undocumented despite the
amnesties because they aim to avoid the cost of regularization altogether. A Turco-
man male interviewee (URFW. 4)38 notes, “I do not receive any visa. I do not go to
my country for obtaining a visa. This process is very expensive. You should give
up all you have earned for this entry and exit process.” Moreover, while undocu-
mented, these individuals lack access to basic services in the workplace health and
safety in particular and health-care services in general. A Ukrainian female intervie-
wee (URFW.1) reports, “We do not have the right to work here, that is why it is
hard ... I do not have health insurance. I do not know any institution about immi-
grants. For the health issue, I am self-funded.” Moreover, they remain a vulnerable
group overall vis-a`-vis any assault or discrimination, which remains unreported due
to fear of deportation. A female Moldovan interviewee (URFW.18) notes, “I do not
feel safe in Turkey. Two years before, I tried to defend myself from someone who
attacked me with a knife. Because of my visa problems, I could not contact the
police.”
The unregistered foreign employees converge on a demand to improve working
conditions. However, a major challenge is lack of awareness of any institutions
and/or initiatives concerning migrants among the migrants themselves. Therefore,
there is a significant lack of congruence between the objectives of the legislation
and initiatives pursued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MoLSS), and
awareness of the implications among the target population. Our interview data
suggest that the LWPF (Law no. 4817) and the amendments did not reach its
target group in letter or spirit when it was amended. A Ukrainian female interviewee
(URFW.1), similar to many others, reports, “I talk with my friends from Ukraine, and
learn issues about immigrants. I do not know any institutions [in Turkey] about [for]
us.” These migrants therefore exist in isolation from the society and institutions and
uninformed about their social, political and economic rights in Turkey while they
operate at the center of labor market exchange for some sectors such as the textile
industry.
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The analysis reveals that the interviewees view the visa application process as com-
plicated and far from welcoming similar to their concerns with the regularization
process, which contributes to the mismatch between policy objectives and what the
policy delivers. A female Bulgarian interviewee (URFW. 2) reports:
Before the application to Residence Permit, I lived here [in Istanbul] for three
months; then go back to Bulgaria and live there for three months. Then, I made
an application in Istanbul that was rejected. I applied in Ankara; they accepted
and gave me a temporary residence permit. Later, when I went to pay for my
Residence Permit in Istanbul, they said that I had to pay a fine since I am
illegal immigrant. Although I said that I had a temporary residence permit,
they did not accept [it]....
Unregistered employment and irregular migration mutually reinforce each other in
Turkey as well. Irregular immigrants cannot be registered if they work due to their
illegal stay in the country; hence they continue to work informally. Once they
work unregistered, they cannot address the security forces or the MoLSS for the vio-
lations of their rights as human beings and/or employees because then they would be
reporting on their immigration status and risking fines and/or expulsion. A major
challenge in this complicated web of relationships is the proliferation of incidents
of maltreatment and harassment in the work place. A male Turcoman interviewee
(URFW. 3) reports:
Our employer took our passports. In the first week of our job, one of our good
friends found a better job for us. We said to our employer ‘Do not give us our
weekly wages give our passports and let us go.’ However, he did not give them
. . . . He said that we could go to police . . .
Moreover, safety in the workplace and the exploitation by the employment agencies
(which usually seize wages for the first few months of employment as service fee)
constitute common challenges for all unregistered foreign workers. Various intervie-
wees note that they have not been allowed lunch breaks, coffee breaks and were
forced to work all days of the week as well as the weekends, day and night,
without any overtime pay. While being subject to inhumane treatment, several of
the unregistered foreigners are still willing to continue to work due to dire conditions
in their countries of origin.
Remaining Unregistered by Force?
The most cited premise in the literature on irregular migration is that the nature of the
liberal market economy perpetuates the informal economy and the employment of
unregistered foreigners39 hence, the increase in unregistered employment is usually
inevitable. In this study such reasoning is not necessarily inevitable except when pol-
icies for monitoring and combatting irregular migration do not match the local needs,
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both of the target population and the receiving state. The data from the interviews
indicate that both irregular migrants and their employers express their concern over
the illegality of their situation and its potentially dire consequences for both
parties. However, they both note that they lack major incentives to rearrange their
conditions toward establishing a legal work contract. One of the employers states
that while authorities remained aware of how they employed foreigners, the infre-
quency of inspections lead them to continue with employing unregistered foreigners.
Both employees and employers also note that their informal interaction with some of
the law enforcement actors also help them prolong illegality viewed as less costly
than legalization by both parties.
While these individuals are employed in the informal economy, they also become
entangled in a web of irregularities in their processes of settlement, integration and
the services they receive for education (mostly of dependents such as spouses and
children), housing and the health-care sector. Different employers highlight that chil-
dren of undocumented migrants attend school with irregular status, which jeopardizes
the continuity of their education. These individuals are also unable to rent decent
houses as landlords are not able to prepare leases with properly arranged legal
rights and responsibilities for the tenants. Moreover, receiving health-care services
for irregular migrants becomes more costly as according to the interview data most
hospitals ask for extra charges in order not to report the status of the patients to
law enforcement officers. While the legislation might provide comprehensive
measures to govern unregistered employment with repeated amendments to existing
legislation as discussed in the section on policies, the incentives for acting within the
requirements of the legislation are neither widely communicated nor promoted
among irregular migrants and their employers.
The demand for cheap immigrant labor in the growing Turkish economy sustains
unregistered employment the most, hence in the short run rendering such demand by
employers unremitting. According to policy-makers at the MoLSS, they have made
repeated efforts to “formalize unregistered workers by offering incentives to clear the
preceding fines for the employers.” However, the policy-makers note that the
employers insist on employing unregistered foreign workers also in order to evade
taxes. The policy-makers dub this as “an attitude of evading taxation,” “avoiding
insurance premiums” and “stealing from the state” in an otherwise lucrative employ-
ment contract. Moreover, the employers highlight the textile sector as requiring dex-
terity, and note that the foreign workers are usually highly skilled labor who would
agree to low-paid jobs in this sector. For example, interview data suggest that
employers prefer to hire “a Russian-speaking packaging assistant who may also
serve as a sales representative” as unregistered, to employing a Turkish person
who would only perform the job s/he has been hired for. Interviews with unregistered
foreign workers confirm this attitude by employers as Russian-speaking women serve
as “models, sales representatives and cleaning ladies.” Therefore, the employers
emphasize their preferences to employ unregistered highly skilled foreign workers
to increase the quality of the product output at lower costs. Consequently, irregular
migrants are caught in a spiral of maltreatment and harassment due to their illegality
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and informality breeding continuous invisibility. The individuals who have taken the
risk of moving to another country for better job prospects and better pay are not able
to take another step/risk to pursue their rights as foreign workers. They become par-
ticipants in the informal economy more than stakeholders for demanding improved
working conditions due to their irregular status.
One other factor that contributes to the mismatch between the policy objective and
outcome rests in these individuals’ preference to remain irregular, despite the risks
involved. Turkey has adopted visa exemptions for touristic travel up to 90 days for
ordinary passport holders for nationals of several countries, which are also main
sources of unregistered foreign workers in Turkey. Interview data suggest that
once these individuals enter Turkey with a tourist visa allowing entry and stay for
up to 90 days, many engage in unregistered employment activity during the period
when their tourist visas (which do not allow employment) remain valid. Should
they prefer to continue unregistered employment, the common practice is to return
to country of origin, obtain a new tourist visa and return to Turkey for another
spell of unregistered employment activity.40 That is, they are legally permitted in
Turkey under a tourist visa, but then participate in unregistered employment that is
not permitted under a tourist visa. Therefore, while visa liberalization policies aim
to increase the volume of trade with certain countries, they have an unintended con-
sequence of promoting unregistered employment in Turkey. While there are no
detailed studies documenting the severity of the adverse effects of these policies
on each other, our interview data suggest that a fair number of tourists in need of
employment are highly likely to take the risk of unregistered employment due to
high rates of unemployment in their countries of origin. Many of the interviewees
note that the cost of living with the fear of expulsion is less than the cost of being
regularized through obtaining valid visas and work permits.41 Nevertheless, there
are other reasons for the existing unregistered foreign labor and irregular migration.
For instance, employers’ attitudes and preferences concerning the employment of
foreigners in the informal economy impact the state’s ability to control international
and irregular migration. Therefore, the choice made by employers for employing
foreigners is not only about hiring cheap labor but also about having more qualified
workers (compared to the natives who would be interested in applying for the same
kind of job) who usually perform various tasks for less pay than native workers.
The income levels of migrants employed in the informal sectors are considerably
lower than those of the natives while still constituting substantially higher earnings
when compared to potential income in the country of origin for a similar job, or
even a highly skilled job. Our interview data also suggest that the employment con-
ditions of Turkish companies operating in the countries of origin of the foreigners in
the informal sector in Turkey serve as a pull factor for these individuals to arrive in
Turkey for employment. Employers also underline the attractiveness of the higher
wages, and that foreign workers receive almost four times (30–40 USD in their
country of origin as opposed to 120–130 USD in Turkey per month) more than
what they would receive in their country of origin for their labor though still less
than what a native worker in Turkey would receive for a similar task. While
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policy-makers are fully aware of the discrepancy in income levels and working con-
ditions of the unregistered foreign workers, the policy initiatives become ineffective
due to the mere scale of the demand for cost-effective employment strategies in the
textile sector.
Conclusion
As an emerging market and a relatively successful survivor of the 2008 economic
crisis, Turkey is increasingly more attractive for non-Turkish nationals who suffer
from high rates of unemployment in their countries of origin. Some of this employ-
ment arrives legally and documented while a large portion arrives irregularly and
stays as undocumented while integrated to the informal labor market, which consti-
tutes close to half of the economy. While aiming to promote registered employment
of and combat unregistered work by foreign nationals, Turkey adopts various policies
and legislation with regulations seemingly easing acquisition of residence and work
permits. However, the policies are generally mere replicas of practices adopted by
other countries, which face irregular migration, and often provide mixed results. In
the case of Turkey, these mixed results are further complicated by how the policy
is received as well as the characteristics of undocumented migration. Evidence in
this research does not suggest that regularization measures such as amnesties are
inherently flawed in themselves. However, it indicates that amnesties address only
part of the problem of irregular migration. This study demonstrates that they may
even perpetuate the problem of irregular migration by implanting an expectation of
the announcement of another amnesty at another time among the irregular migrants.
On the policy side, the different regulations usually have their own limits. Until the
April 2013, LFIP, legislation has been dispersed and remained open to administrative
discretion. The amnesties and various regularization facilitation attempts had been
restricted by time limitations, fines had been considered high and procedures far
too complicated. After 2010, electronic applications became common in the
issuing of work permits and following the processes of residence permits.
However, end users note the difficulties of using the system and consultancy firms
intervene to facilitate the implementation of the policy costing both the foreign
workers and their employers’ additional funds.
When analyzed from the point of unregistered foreigners, largely their preferences
have been to remain unregistered, not because they aim to engage in illegal acts but
because remaining unregistered is viewed as less costly by most. Although most
prefer to receive equal pay for equal work, they prefer to be employed as undocumen-
ted to not having any income while in Turkey. The interviews confirm the findings in
the literature that irregular immigrants face serious challenges concerning the job
search, employers’ attitudes, challenges of middlemen extracting income, working
conditions, problems in relation to the state practices, unfair treatment by state auth-
orities, stereotyping in the case of female migrants, lack of support for health policy,
visa problems, and finally problems about their social life (adaptation to the culture in
Turkey, housing problems and public attitude suggesting discrimination).
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This study aimed to explain why policies for combatting irregular migration and
unregistered employment have not worked in the case of Turkey similar to many
other countries. In contrast to most of the literature, which, for instance, focuses on
the shortcomings of the existing policies, this research examines all sides of the
testing process of irregular migration (policy-makers, employers and foreign
workers). This study identifies four main reasons as to why the existing policies do
not stop irregular migration and unregistered employment of foreigners. First, the pol-
icies have not been sufficiently adapted to the needs of the local context. Most of the
policies such as amnesties are short-term focused and produce precarious results as
they have done in other countries. Second, there are inherent problems such as the dis-
persed nature of the legislation prior to theApril 2013LFIP,which left room for admin-
istrative discretion thereby rendering the policy objective of combatting irregular
migration almost unattainable. Third, unregistered employment in Turkey is nurtured
by both the attractiveness of the growing economy in Turkey and the preferences of
foreign workers as well as employers for unregistered work. Therefore, the choice to
remain unregistered, despite its dire consequences, is likely to render all policy initiat-
ives inapplicable. Finally, there is an urgent need to conduct an impact analysis of the
causes and consequences of irregular migration in Turkey in order to devise a compre-
hensive and context sensitive policy framework that will support the recent LFIP.
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